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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

DOUGLAS STEWART CARTER,

:

Case No. 920110

Priority No. 15

Defendant-Appellant. :
STATE'S ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
Defendant-Appellant Douglas Stewart Carter (Carter) has
petitioned for rehearing of this Court's opinion, State
Carter,

v.

233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah March 2, 1994) ("Carter

II"),

affirming a sentence of death imposed for first degree murder,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990) (now aggravated murder, Supp.
1993).

Accepting this Court's May 19, 1994 invitation, the State

now answers Carter's petition.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REHEARING
The State reframes the questions presented in Carter's
rehearing petition, as follows:
1.

Do Carter's Allegations of Flawed "Harmless Error"

Disposition Warrant Rehearing of the Following Issues?
a.

Admission, at Carter's Second Penalty Hearing,

of the Abstract of Testimony Given at His First Trial.
b.

Giving a "Heinousness" Instruction to the

Second Penalty Hearing Jury.
c.

Admission of Victim Impact Evidence at the

Second Penalty Hearing.

2.

Do Either "Cumulative Error" or Independent State

Constitutional Analysis Warrant Rehearing this Appeal?
3.

Was There "Plain Error" in the Reasonable Doubt

Instruction Given at Carter's Original 1985 Guilt Phase Trial?
4.

Do "Additional Points" Submitted Pro Se by Carter

Warrant Rehearing this Appeal?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The federal constitutional "Due Process" clauses and
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments," U.S. CONST. AMENDS
V, VII, XIV, invoked by Carter, are familiar.

The text of any

other pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules
will be set forth as needed in the main text of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The challenged death sentence was imposed following a
second penalty hearing, held in 1992 after this Court's reversal
of the death sentence imposed following Carter's original 1985
trial and first penalty hearing, in State v. Carter,
(Utah 1989) (''Carter

I").

In Carter

II,

116 P.2d 886

233 Utah Adv. Rep. at

19-21, this Court thoroughly recited the facts of the case.
Those facts will be addressed as needed under the pertinent
argument points of this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Partial amendment of this Court's opinion affirming
Carter's death sentence seems appropriate to clarify the
"harmless error" analysis applied to certain issues.
2

Such

clarification does not warrant a change in the resolution of
Carter's appeal, however.
Carter's "cumulative error" complaint fails because his
complaints of error either fail altogether or can be deemed by
this Court to be harmless even under a strict "beyond reasonable
doubt" harmlessness review.

Carter's attempt to achieve extra

protection under the Utah Constitution's "Open Courts" clause has
been waived, and is wholly unsupported by analysis.
Carter's complaint of "plain error" in the "reasonable
doubt" instruction given at his original 1985 trial fails because
no "obvious" error can be committed via failure to anticipate
this Court's later rejection of that instruction, which had
enjoyed approval for about a century.

Further, a recent United

States Supreme Court decision makes clear that the challenged
instruction passes federal constitutional scrutiny, even though
it has been prohibited under this Court's supervisory authority.
As clarified by this Court, that prohibition does not apply
retroactively, and therefore does not apply to this case.
Finally, Carter's pro se challenge to the aggravated
burglary instruction, an aggravating circumstance that raised the
murder to first degree murder, is meritless.

The challenged

instruction actually benefitted Carter, by omitting burglary
aggravators that either duplicated aspects of the murder or were
unnecessary to prove the State's case.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE ALLEGED FLAWS IN THIS COURT'S "HARMLESS
ERROR" RESOLUTION OF CERTAIN ISSUES WARRANT
NO CHANGE IN THE OUTCOME OF CARTER'S APPEAL
Carter first alleges that this Court erroneously held
certain errors at the second penalty hearing to be harmless. He
properly concedes that the United States Supreme Court permits
appellate "harmlessness" analysis of errors in death penalty
deliberations, e.g., demons v. Mississippi,
(1990), Satterwhite

v.

Texas,

494 U.S. 738, 754

486 U.S. 249, 257-58 (1988) (Pet.

for Reh'g at 5). Nevertheless, Carter invites this Court to
disclaim harmless error analysis of such deliberations as a means
to "impose more . . . procedural protections on the capital
defendant" (Pet. at 6). This Court should decline Carter's
invitation, because he has not demonstrated that currently
existing procedural protections are inadequate.
Carter also correctly observes that two harmless error
standards exist.

For nonconstitutional error, the appellant must

show a reasonable likelihood that, absent the alleged error, the
trial court result would have been different.
770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989).

State

v.

Verde,

However, an error that violates

constitutional rights is presumptively cause for reversal, unless
the appellee can show that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
(1986); State

Delaware

v. Hackford,

v. Van Arsdall,

475 U.S. 673, 678-84

737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987).

As

will be discussed, Carter's rehearing petition raises a fair
4

question about which harmless error standard might apply to
certain issues in this case.
Carter's specific allegations of error under this point
challenge the manner in which this Court analyzed the admission
of certain evidence at his second penalty hearing, plus a
contention that the second penalty jury should not have been
instructed on "heinousness" as an aggravating consideration.

As

follows, the alleged errors may warrant amendment, in part, of
this Court's opinion; however, no change in this Court's
affirmance of the death sentence is warranted.
A.

Transcript of Testimony Given at Carter's First
Trial: Harmless Beyond Reasonable Doubt.
Carter renews his contention that Utah Code Ann. § 76-

3-207(4) (1990) was unconstitutionally used to admit the
"abstracted" transcript of testimony given at his first trial.
In this appeal, this Court construed section 76-3-207(4) to
permit the reading of such transcripts to the jury, but banned
their physical admission as evidentiary exhibits.

This was done

to cure section 76-3-207(4) of its infringement, in the Court's
view, upon the Sixth Amendment "confrontation clause."
II,

Carter

233 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24-25.1

x

The State questions this and the other modifications that the
Court engrafted on to the statute. It appears to the State that
while purporting to "save" section 76-3-207(4) from constitutional
defects, this Court really did something it has elsewhere
disclaimed: it "edit[ed] the legislature's work to conform with
this Court's view on how the statute should have been drafted."
State v. Bishop,
753 P.2d 439, 487 (Utah 1988) (guoted in Br. of
Appellee at 22).
5

The foregoing limiting construction of the statute was
not observed at Carter's second penalty hearing; the trial court
admitted the transcript as an exhibit.

This oversight was

understandable given that this Court's limiting construction was
not yet in existence.

However, Carter argues that because this

Court at least implicitly deemed the transcript's admission to
violate his confrontation right, the trial court's oversight
amounted to constitutional error.

Such error, he continues,

presumptively requires reversal (Pet. at 8, numbered paras. 6-8).
This Court does appear to have overlooked the question
whether such error in the application of section 76-3-207(4) was
nonconstitutional or constitutional in nature, and the question
of which harmless error standard should apply.

E.g.,

Carter

II,

233 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25-26 ("we do not find the error harmful or
prejudicial"); id.

at 26 ("we do not believe the impact of that

evidence was unduly magnified by letting the jurors read what
they had already heard").

It would be appropriate for this Court

to amend its opinion, clarifying the harmlessness analysis that
it has applied to the transcript admission problem.2
Given the complex relationship between constitutional
confrontation principles and nonconstitutional hearsay

2

Such amendment seems advisable in light of demons.
In that
case, the federal Supreme Court could not discern from the record
whether the Mississippi Supreme Court applied the correct harmless
error analysis, or "reweighing" of aggravating and mitigating
factors, once it determined that one aggravator supporting a death
sentence was flawed because of an improper jury instruction.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Mississippi
Supreme Court for clarification. 494 U.S. at 754.
6

principles, California

v. Green,

399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970), and

further given that strict confrontation principles are
inapplicable to capital penalty hearings, Williams

v. New York,

337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949), it is open to debate which standard for
harmless error applies to this situation.

Without conceding the

question (and reserving its right to argue, upon fuller analysis,
that a nonconstitutional harmlessness standard applies), the
State believes that for purposes of deciding Carter's rehearing
petition, even the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
is satisfied in this case.
This stricter harmlessness standard is satisfied
because Carter cannot complain that the content of the first
trial transcript was inadmissible at his second penalty hearing;
he complains only of the form in which that content was
presented.

The most damning content was the transcribed

testimony of Epifanio and Lucia Tovar, who described how Carter,
prior to murdering Eva Oleson, expressed an intention to "go
rape, break, and drive."

After the murder, Carter admitted his

crime to the Tovars, even pantomiming it for them while laughing.
Carter

II,

233 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26, 38 n. 18.
As this Court aptly observed, the Tovars' transcribed

testimony "undoubtedly had a dramatic impact simply from being
read into the record."

Id.

at 26.

Because the jury at Carter's

second penalty hearing was thus overwhelmingly likely to remember
the Tovars' testimony as it was read aloud to them, the effect of
also being provided with a written transcript was trivial.
7

Accordingly, if admitting the transcript as an exhibit was error,
such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
B.

Proper Instruction About Heinous Murder.
Carter next contends that the State presented

insufficient evidence to justify instructing the second penalty
jury on "heinousness" as an aggravating factor in support of a
death sentence.

Quoting State

v.

Tuttle,

780 P.2d 1203, 1217

(Utah 1989), Carter argues that the way in which he murdered Eva
Oleson was not "qualitatively and quantitatively different and
more culpable than that necessary to accomplish the murder," and
that the evidence failed to show that he intended "to cause
wholly unnecessary suffering" to Mrs. Oleson (Pet. at 10).
Therefore, the argument goes, it was improper to instruct the
jury about heinousness, as "demonstrated by physical torture,
serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim
before death," Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1) (q) (Supp. 1992).
But as this Court recognized, Carter in fact did commit
acts that were significantly different than those necessary to
murder Eva Oleson.

Carter tied Mrs. Oleson's hands behind her

and stripped her naked below the waist.
Rep. at 19.

Carter

II,

233 Utah Adv.

Rather than shoot her immediately--a dubiously "less

heinous" approach--Carter then stabbed Mrs. Oleson numerous
times; by his own confession, she then lay moaning as Carter
explored her home for items to steal (Br. of Appellee at 47).
In light of the foregoing evidence, the State maintains
its position that the heinousness instruction was properly given
8

(Br. of Appellee at 46-49).

Even if Carter's treatment of Mrs.

Oleson might not be labelled "torture," it certainly amounted to
"serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim
before death" under the heinousness definition.

It was therefore

proper to instruct the jury on this statutory aggravating factor.
While the Court avoided this question, Carter

II,

233 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 29, it need not have done so.
This Court correctly acknowledged that even if
improperly instructed on "heinousness," the jury was bound to
consider Carter's actions against Mrs. Oleson in any event, under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2) (1990).
Rep. at 29.

Carter

II,

233 Utah Adv.

This provision admits any sentence-relevant

evidence, "including but not limited to the nature and
circumstances of the crime . . .."

Because individualized

sentencing is the rule, section 76-3-207(2) clearly permitted-indeed, probably demanded--jury consideration of Carter's
particular actions.3 And because the aggravating factor of
aggravated burglary legitimately made Carter death-eligible in
any event, the jury permissibly considered Carter's particular
abuse of Mrs. Oleson in its sentencing deliberations.
This Court also accurately held that even if the
heinousness instruction should not have been given, error in
giving it was harmless.

The second sentencing jury could--and,

the State submits, did--find Carter's abuse of Mrs. Oleson to be
3

Thus Carter is wrong in his assertion that the "heinousness"
instruction was "the sole means to present such a [penalty]
framework to the jury" (Pet. at 16, numbered para. 3).
9

far worse than what a "simple murderer" (Pet. at 20) would do.
Accordingly, any hypothesized error in giving the heinousness
instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
C.

Victim Impact Evidence:

No Constitutional Error.

Carter re-assails the admission of victim impact
evidence as presumptively reversible constitutional error under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution (Pet. at 22). He mistakenly ignores the specific
holding of Payne v.

Tennessee,

U.S.

(1991), recognized by this Court in Carter

, 111 S. Ct. 2597
II,

233 Utah Adv. Rep.

at 32, that victim impact evidence can be admitted under these
constitutional provisions.
Therefore, if this Court correctly deemed that the
victim impact evidence in this case was inadmissible under the
factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2) (1990), such
error clearly was not constitutional in nature; only a statutory
provision was violated.

Therefore, the "beyond reasonable doubt"

standard for harmlessness does not apply; instead, it is Carter's
burden to show that the error was harmful.

His burden is made

heavier given that this Court has already held that the asserted
error was harmless.

Carter

II,

233 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33.

In his

rehearing petition, Carter makes no effort to carry his burden of
proving harm; therefore, his argument fails.

Overall, none of

Carter's "harmful error" complaints under this point give cause
to set aside the death sentence.

10

POINT TWO
NEITHER "CUMULATIVE ERROR" NOR INDEPENDENT
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS WARRANT
REHEARING OF THIS APPEAL
Arguing that the alleged errors discussed in Point One
of this brief were cumulatively harmful, and thus cause for
reversing his death sentence, Carter misreads a part of
v. Mississippi,

494 U.S. 738 (1990).

demons

The passage cited by Carter

(Pet. at 25) did not state that appellate harmless error analysis
is necessarily "extremely speculative or impossible."
the Court said:
conclude

Rather,

"In some situations, a state appellate court may-

that peculiarities in a case make appellate reweighing

or harmless-error analysis extremely speculative or impossible."
demons,

494 U.S. at 754 (emphasis added).

Court's resolution of Carter

II

Implicit in this

is a sound conclusion that it did

not require extreme speculation to find that any errors in
Carter's second penalty hearing, individually or cumulatively,
were not so harmful as to require reversal.
In fact, as set forth in Point One of this brief,
Carter's arguments on the admission of the first trial
transcript, and evidence of the "heinous" or especially abusive
treatment of the victim, would in no way bar presentation of the
underlying evidence to the second penalty jury:

only the

particular presentation form, or framework for considering that
evidence, would be implicated.

And due to the limited nature of

the challenged victim impact testimony, that evidence was not
unduly prejudicial.

Carter

II,

233 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33.
11

Summarizing the matter in familiar terms, this Court reasonably
concluded that even if Carter did not have a perfect second
penalty hearing, he had a fair one.

Cf. State

v. Andrews,

843

P.2d 1027, 1034 (Utah 1992) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) ("[E]ven
where death is the penalty, perfection is not the standard by
which we are to judge counsel, the jury, the trial judge, or the
appellate proceedings").
Carter's claim that this Court's harmless error
judgments violated the Utah Constitution is set forth as a
separate point in his Petition for Rehearing--where he raises it
for the first time.

Besides having been thus waived, the point

consists of merely a single sentence, quoting the constitution's
"Open Courts Clause."
be summarily rejected.

Thus lacking in analysis, the point should
See State

v. Bishop,

753 P.2d 439, 450

(Utah 1988) (appellate court is not a "dumping ground" for
undeveloped arguments).
POINT THREE
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE "PLAIN ERROR" IN THE
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION GIVEN AT
CARTER'S ORIGINAL 1985 GUILT PHASE TRIAL
In the third point in his Petition for Rehearing,
Carter alleges alleges that the "reasonable doubt" instruction
given at the guilt phase of his original 1985 trial was
erroneous.

Because this issue has not been previously presented

in this case, it can only be reached via the "plain error"
analysis of State

v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), which

requires Carter to show that the instruction was (1) erroneous;
12

(2) "obviously" or "palpably" so; and (3) prejudicial, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable guilt phase result.
proven plain error.

Id.

at 1208-09.

Carter has not

Shuffling the order of these elements a bit,

the "obviousness" and "error" elements are absent.
The 1985 reasonable doubt instruction (R. 167,
partially set forth in Pet. at 26-27) contains language
equivalent to the "more weighty affairs of life" formulation that
this Court, acting in its "supervisory capacity," later forbade
in State v. Ireland,
still, in State

773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 1989).

v. Johnson,

Later

774 P.2d 1141, 1147-49 (Utah 1989)

(concurring opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Durham and
Zimmerman, JJ.), three members of this Court again condemned the
"weighty affairs" formulation of reasonable doubt.4 However,
only Justice Stewart has contended that a "weighty affairs"
instruction given in a pre-Ireland case was obviously or
"palpably" erroneous.

See Tillman

v.

Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 230

(Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., dissenting, in appeal from denial of
state postconviction relief; trial court conviction in 1983);
State

v. Menzies,

235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 30-31 (Utah 1994)

4

Then-Chief Justice Hall, who wrote the main opinion in
Johnson, disapproved the concurring justices' decision to reach the
reasonable doubt instruction issue, which had not been argued or
briefed by the parties. Johnson, 77'4 P.2d at 1146.
The reasonable doubt jury instruction at Carter's second
penalty hearing, in 1992, properly omitted the "weighty affairs"
language (Instruction No. 6, copied in the State's Br. of Appellee,
Appendix XII).
13

{Menzies

II)

(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part; trial court conviction in 1988).
Carter now joins Justice Stewart's contention that a
"weighty affairs" instruction, given years before this Court
forbade it, is "palpably" erroneous.

The most direct answer to

that contention^ however, is that Carter's trial court, in 1985,
like that of Tillman in 1983 and of Menzies in 1988, cannot be
said to have "palpably" erred by failing to predict that in 1989,
the "weighty affairs" formulation of reasonable doubt would be
forbidden; after all, it had been approved nearly a century
earlier by the United States Supreme Court, in Hopt v. Utah,

120

U.S. 430, 439-41 (1887) (holding "weighty and important concerns"
formulation to be "as just a guide to practical men as can well
be given . . . " ) .

Accordingly, the "obviousness" or "palpable"

element of plain error is not met in Carter's belated challenge
to the 1985 reasonable doubt instruction.
Nor is the "error" element satisfied--at least as a
matter of federal constitutional law.
92-8894,

U.S.L.W.

In Victor

v. Nebraska,

No.

, 54 Cr. L. 2225 (March 22, 1994)

(consolidated with Sandoval

v.

California,

No. 92-9049), the

United States Supreme Court upheld a Nebraska jury instruction
that stated, among other things:

"'Reasonable doubt' is such a

doubt as would cause a reasonable and prudent person, in one of
the graver and more important
hesitate

transactions

of life,

to pause

and

before taking the represented facts as true and relying

and acting thereon."

Victor,

54 Cr. L. at 2229 (emphasis added).
14

In upholding the instruction against a Due Process Clause
challenge, the Court observed that the emphasized language "is a
formulation we have repeatedly approved[.]"
Hopt and Holland

v.

United

States,

Id.

at 2230 (citing

348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954)).

Because the "graver and more important transactions"
language in the Nebraska instruction is equivalent to the
Ireland

"weighty affairs" formulation used prior to this Court's

ruling, it seems clear that the latter formulation also passes
federal Due Process muster.

Accordingly, because there is no

constitutional error in the use of the instruction, the "error"
element of plain error is unmet.

It therefore does not matter

whether some different reasonable doubt instruction, if requested
and given, might have achieved an acquittal for Carter:

this

"prejudice" element of plain error obviously does not apply when
obvious error is absent.
It bears mention that Carter may mean to argue that
this Court's prohibition of the "weighty affairs" reasonable
doubt formulation in Ireland
case.

should retroactively apply to his

That would be correct only if Ireland

established a new

rule of federal constitutional law, inasmuch as Carter's first
appeal was still pending when Ireland
v. Kentucky,

479 U.S. 314 (1987).

Supreme Court's Victor

was issued.

See

Griffith

However, as the federal

opinion makes clear, Ireland

cannot be

construed to rest upon federal Due Process principles.

Instead,

it rests only upon this Court's supervisory authority, 773 P.2d

15

at 1380.5

Consistent with this, in Menzies

II,

235 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 32 n.7, this Court declared that the Ireland
only prospective in its operation.
application of the Ireland

ruling was

In sum, any argument for

ruling to this case--be it "plain

error" or retroactivity--cannot prevail.
POINT FOUR
CARTER'S "ADDITIONAL, POINTS," SUBMITTED PRO
SE, DO NOT WARRANT REHEARING THIS APPEAL
Carter's pro se arguments for rehearing really boil
down to one argument, dealing with the 1985 guilt phase trial:
Carter asserts that he was not properly put on notice, as a
matter of due process, of his need to defend against the
aggravated burglary charge, encompassed within the first degree
murder charge.

That argument is frivolous.

The criminal information filed against Carter in 1985
clearly accuses him of intentionally killing Eva Oleson under
five alternative circumstances, raising the killing to first
degree murder under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(d) (Supp. 1985)
(R. 26-27) . The second of those circumstances specifies the
allegation that "the homicide was committed while the actor was
engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit aggravated
burglary" (R. 26). This put Carter on notice that to defend
himself against the first degree murder charge, he would have to

5

Nor can the State find any indication that the Ireland ruling
was ever intended to rest upon an independent, state constitutionbased due process ground, UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 7.
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defend against the aggravating circumstance of aggravated
burglary, defined in Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-203, -202 (1990).
Carter's related argument about the 1985 jury
instruction on the elements of aggravated burglary is similarly
frivolous.

He complains of a variance between the offense as

statutorily defined and as instructed at his trial (Pet. at 33).
That variance existed because the instruction omitted
burglary aggravators that were duplicative of the injuries
inflicted while murdering Eva Oleson, i.e., "causes bodily
injury" and "uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous
weapon," Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(1)(a), -(b) (1990).

Instead,

the instruction relied solely upon the subsection (1)(c) burglary
aggravator--"possesses or attempts to use any explosive or
dangerous weapon."

That aggravator was also tailored to the

minimum necessary to fit the particular facts of Carter's
offense, to read simply "defendant was armed with or possessed a
deadly weapon" (R. 118, Pet. at 33).
By thus tailoring the aggravated burglary instruction
to require a finding of only one burglary aggravator, Carter's
defense was actually aided.

He did not need to defend against

the aggravator of causing injury or threatening Eva Oleson (even
though he clearly did these things); nor did possession of an
"explosive" weapon enter into the picture.

He only had to defend

against the allegation that he possessed a deadly weapon when he
committed burglary by unlawfully entering or remaining in Eva
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Oleson's home.

Carter's argument on this point therefore clearly

does not warrant rehearing of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
As set forth in Point One of this brief, amendment of
this Court's opinion to clarify the "harmless error" standards
under certain issues would be appropriate.

Neither such

amendment, nor any other of the alleged flaws in this Court's
opinion, affirming Carter's death sentence, warrants further
rehearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of July, 1994.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

J. KEVIN MURPHY1
Assistant Attorney General
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